As Russia’s war in Ukraine approaches the end of its first year, Republicans and conservatives face some difficult and divisive questions about America’s involvement. Robert Zubrin made the case on the home page over the weekend that the Biden administration could be doing more to help Volodymyr Zelensky and his government deliver a disabling blow to Russia’s aggressive military machine, and noted that some on the right are so hostile to the Ukrainian cause that they may fairly be described as Putin apologists — more sympathetic to Putin and his regime than to Zelensky and his elected government. (I would part company with Zubrin to the extent that he identifies particular people in this way without specific quotations, and to the extent that he conflates opposition to supporting Ukraine with being a Putin apologist.)

There is, however, a very wide gulf between “We should do more in Ukraine to confront Russia” and “We should do nothing to help Ukraine,” and most Republicans and conservatives — whether they be elected officials, commentators, or ordinary voters — fall somewhere along that spectrum. That presents a challenge to Kevin McCarthy and Mitch McConnell in managing their respective caucuses on this issue (McCarthy’s caucus is the more restive of the two), and it presents a challenge to Republican presidential contenders in framing both a political message and a policy that could be carried into the White House.

Enter Ron DeSantis. The Florida governor is looking more and more like a presidential candidate. He gave Salena Zito a tour of his hometown, is launching a book the end of this month, and is speaking today to a law-enforcement group on Staten Island. As I noted in my review for the magazine of DeSantis on foreign-policy and national-security issues, he is the furthest thing from a Putin apologist, but he has been playing his cards close to the vest on aid to Ukraine:

When Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, DeSantis branded the Russian leader an "authoritarian gas-station attendant," blasted Europeans for buying energy that funds Putin's regime, and argued that gaining independence from Russian oil and gas by boosting U.S. energy production would hit Putin where it hurts and weaken his grip on power by hitting the pocketbooks of Russian oligarchs. . . .

Unlike Donald Trump or other figures on the populist right such as Tucker Carlson (on whose show the governor is a frequent guest), DeSantis has not showered foreign authoritarians with praise or pandered to resentment of Ukraine and its leader. . . .

His rhetorical line has been consistently anti-Putin and pro-Ukraine. Nevertheless he defended Elon Musk, who used his satellites to aid the Ukrainian war effort, when Ukrainian officials criticized him for a comment he made about the war. That drew a reaction from DeSantis in defense of a magnate who has expressed support for the governor: "Don't bite the hand that feeds you — good Lord!" But he has been circumspect on topics such as the limits of U.S. aid to Ukraine, other than taking an uncontroversial stance against direct American military intervention.

On Fox & Friends this morning, following Joe Biden’s visit to Kyiv, DeSantis waded further into the debate:

"These things can escalate, and I don't think it's in our interest to be getting into proxy war — with China getting involved — over things like the border lands, or over Crimea," he said. "I think it would behoove them to identify what is the strategic objective they're trying to achieve. Just saying it's an open ended blank check that is not acceptable," DeSantis said.

The governor was asked what a "win" would look like for Ukraine. "The fear of Russia going into NATO countries [and] steamrolling — you know, that has not even come close to happening. I think they've shown themselves to be a third rate military power," he said. "I think they've suffered tremendous, tremendous losses. I gotta think that the people in Russia are probably disapproving of what's going on. I don't think they can speak up about it for obvious reasons."

DeSantis downplayed the threat of Russia to the U.S. in comparison to China. "I don't think that they are the same threat to our country, even though they're hostile. I don't think they're on the same level as a China."

All of this is correct as a general matter. It is true that Biden has failed to make the case to the American people regarding our strategy or desired end state in Ukraine, repeating the error of so many wartime presidents before him. He conspicuously refused to use this year’s State of the Union speech to make the case for what we are doing in Ukraine. It is true that there are limits to what we can or will spend on this conflict, and that we will hit those political limits sooner if the president fails to keep the public on board. National Review‘s editorials have been consistently supportive of aid to Ukraine, but as our editorial following Zelensky’s December speech to Congress observed that:

We cannot indefinitely dodge the question of what we should do if the war drags on, or how we intend to pay for this. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, our current rate of spending on Ukraine is running at just under $7 billion a month. That means that, if the war continues (and it probably will), another aid package will have to be agreed to in the course of next year. That will be entirely deficit spending if no effort is made to sacrifice other spending priorities. The U.S. also needs to have formed a clearer view of its strategy before then. Waiting for Putin to die or be overthrown is not a strategy. And neither is waiting for a Russian economic or military collapse. However unlikely, the last of these possibilities, in particular, comes fraught with nuclear peril.

If our strategy is to continue on our current path, that needs to be acknowledged, as does the importance of ensuring that our European allies do their part, something that cannot be taken for granted. We must also face the reality that the longer this conflict persists, the greater the danger of a more widespread and, possibly, nuclear war. To reduce that possibility, we should still avoid supplying weapons that Ukraine could use to strike deep into Russia.

If we are unwilling to maintain our current level of support for Ukraine indefinitely, we should be working behind the scenes to push Kyiv toward a deal. One reason to do so now is the stronger bargaining power that Ukraine should enjoy as a result of its battlefield success.

It is also true that China is the larger threat than Russia, although simply saying so avoids the question: Are we better off demonstrating our resolve against the China-Russia-Iran axis by continuing to resist the tip of its spear in Ukraine, or by husbanding our finite resources in preparation for a possible conflict in Taiwan? DeSantis hints at his answer, but doesn’t say. For now, as merely a prospective candidate hawking a book, he doesn’t have to; soon enough, he will.

DeSantis is, as usual, taking a position that is politically savvy and as close to the center of the party’s current mood as possible in beating up on Biden, being hawkish on China, deriding Putin, and questioning where the limits are while not actually calling for abandoning the Ukrainian cause. It’s a stance that requires potential competitors to move far to one side or the other, alienating a lot of the party, in order to get a clean shot at him. Once he’s a declared candidate, however, he will need to begin more seriously addressing these questions not only as a Republican maneuvering for a nomination, but as a potential leader of the free world. In doing so, he should not lose sight of the vital American interest in finishing a job we’ve already begun.